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Abstract 
 
In looking at the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper brings together two different 
debates: the well-established debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union sees national 
Parliaments as guarantor of one branch of a “dual” legitimacy. The more recent debate on 
“Europeanization” addresses the impacts that European integration has had on its Member States. 
Analyzing the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper identifies and analyzes three 
dimensions: legislative Europeanization – the extent to which legislative decision making by the German 
Bundestag has been influenced by European stipulations over the last twenty years; institutional 
Europeanization – how the Bundestag as an institution reacted to this loss of function by establishing 
institutional and procedural provisions for influencing the government’s Euro-politics; and strategic 
Europeanization – the ways in which individual MPs started more recently to develop euro-political 
strategies that go beyond controlling the national government. The paper shows that the Bundestag only 
hesitantly reacted to the increasing loss of functions through legislative Europeanization by establishing 
effective institutional and procedural provisions for controlling the government’s Euro-political activities. 
What is more, the establishment of institutions does not guarantee their effective use. All in all, Euro-
politics continues to remain the activity of few MPs. These few, however, have more recently started to 
europeanize their strategies. The empirical findings support the claim that the traditional concept of 
chains of legitimacy is inadequate, both in conceptual and in empirical terms. With regard to the democ-
ratic legitimacy of EU governance, this indicates that, apart from major reform projects, especially with 
regard to everyday legislation, not too great a burden should be placed on national Parliaments.  
 
 
 
Introduction1
 
 Like the entire German governmental system, the Bundestag (the Lower House of the 
German Parliament) has experienced sweeping “Europeanization,”2 particularly so in the 
course of the last twenty years. While the process of European integration has had its effect on 
the Bundestag and its scope of action, the German Parliament has developed a series of institu-
tional and strategic responses to these challenges. What is more, the Bundestag functions in an 
environment where actors at the European level are also intensifying their efforts to deal with 
the role of national parliaments in the European multi-level system.  
 
This paper employs the example of the Bundestag to link two major debates: first, the dis-
cussion regarding the democratic legitimacy of governance by the European Union in general, 
and the role of national Parliaments in guaranteeing this legitimacy in particular; and second, the 
more recent discussion on the “Europeanization” of EU-member states, namely, the impact that 
European integration has on the institutional setting,among other things.  
 
Almost all recent theories associate democracy with a major role for parliaments. The pro-
gressing integration of Europe, where competences have increasingly been transferred to the 
Community, however, caused decision-making responsibilities to shift especially from the Bun-
destag to the Federal executive branch,3 for those competences transferred to the European 
level are dealt with by the European Council, whose members are representatives of their 
respective national governments. The Council as a whole is not subject to any parliamentary 
control. Notwithstanding the fact that the role of the European Parliament has considerably 
gained in clout, it has neither the same quality nor range of procedural rights that national 
parliaments4 enjoy(ed); that is why in this context we speak of de-parliamentarization and hence 
of de-democratization of decision-making processes.5 This forms the core of the much discussed 
                                                 
1I am indebted to Katrin Auel, Sven Grimm, Andrew Moravcsik, Rainer Prätorius, Tapio Raunio and Sar-
ang D. Thakkar for their very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, to Johanna Elo-
Schäfer for her research assistance, Alfons Holzem for language support and Andy Martin for working 
thoroughly over the text – in terms of both substance and language. I assume sole responsibility for this 
paper. 
2The term “Europeanization“ as used in this paper is confined to Europe as it is organized in the Euro-
pean Union, Beate Kohler-Koch, ‘Europäisierung: Plädoyer für eine Horizonterweiterung,’ in Michèle 
Knodt and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Campus, 2000), p. 12. 
3See Rita Süssmuth, ‘Vorwort,‘ in Europäisches Zentrum für Parlamentarische Wissenschaft und Doku-
mentation (ed.): Seminar zur Rolle der Parlamente beim Entstehen von EG-Recht und dessen Umsetzung in na-
tionales Recht, Berlin, 3/4 March 1994, p. 3; Tanja A. Börzel, ‘Europäisierung und innerstaatlicher Wandel. 
Zentralisierung und Entparlamentarisierung?‘ Politische Vierteljahresschrift 41,2 (2000): 230. 
4This paper addresses primarily procedures established in the Community pillar. In the field of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy as well as Justice and Home Affairs/Police and Judicial Co-operation, the 
major lack of powers of the European Parliament aggravates the problem even more; see Andreas 
Maurer, ‘Nationale Parlamente in der Europäischen Union – Herausforderungen für den Konvent,’ Inte-
gration 25,1 (2002): 25. I am grateful for Andy Martin’s comment that basically the same holds true for 
both the highly insulated policy by the ECB and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
5Annette Elisabeth Töller, Europapolitik im Bundestag (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang,1995); Andreas Maurer, 
op. cit., p. 21; Thomas König, ‘Unitarisierung durch Europäisierung?’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 36 
(2005): 28-32. 
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“European democracy deficit.“6 Approaches to a solution of this problem are mainly based on 
the idea of a dual legitimacy. While the European Parliament – directly elected since 1979 and 
drawing more and more legislative competences7 since the Single European Act in 1987 – is 
generally granted legitimizing functions, at least some authors question a number of basic 
conditions for the legitimizing power of the European Parliament’s role in legislation.8 On a 
different note, national parliaments are given a substantial role in developing individual national 
legitimation chains, which should provide for a link between the electorate and the government 
representatives in the Council.9 For a long time, this role of national parliaments was taken for 
granted, without caring about the factual degree of involvement displayed by the national 
parliaments. Only in the mid-1990s did scholarly debate start to address the involvement of 
national parliaments in European politics in empirical terms.10
 
However, focusing the discussion on national chains of legitimacy is problematic in itself. It re-
quires a functioning chain of control of the national governments’ European policies which, 
given the time and effort that most national parliaments devote to politics at the European level, 
is far from being real.11 What is more, viewing the national governments as links in chains of 
legitimacy rests on a conceptualization of the European system as a “two-level system,”12 in 
                                                 
6For critical comments on the “democratic deficit” see Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic 
Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40,4 (2002): 
603-624. 
7This increase in legislative competence, on the one hand, results from the creation of ever new proce-
dures for EP participation in European legislation. The EP’s legislative powers were successively en-
hanced from consultation to cooperation to co-decision procedures. On the other hand, particularly co-
decision procedure, once created, has progressively been stretched to ever more issues. The European 
Parliament, however, still has no right to initiate legislation. 
8Critics see the (according to their view, lacking) existence of a European public sphere, relevant political 
parties and a collective European identity as a precondition for the sovereignty of the people being exer-
cised via parliamentary representation at European level and for the application of the majority rule. See 
Shirley Williams, ‘Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community,’ in Robert O. Keohane 
and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boul-
der CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 155-176; Rainer M. Lepsius, ‘Nationalstaat oder Nationalitätenstaat als Mo-
dell für die Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft,’ in Rudolf Wildenmann (ed.), Staatswerd-
ung Europas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), pp. 19-40; Peter Graf Kiel-
mansegg, ‘Integration und Demokratie,’ in Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.): Europä-
ische Integration (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996), pp. 47-71; for critical annotations see Ingolf Pernice, 
The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, WHI- Paper 5/01, www.whi-berlin.de/.  
9Tapio Raunio, ‘Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union,’ Government 
and Opposition 34,2 (1999): 185; Sven Hölscheidt, ‘Mitwirkungsrechte des Deutschen Bundestags in An-
gelegenheiten der EU,‘ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 28 (2000): 31-38; Ingolf Pernice, op. cit., p. 3. 
10David Judge, ‘The Failure of National Parliaments,’ West European Politics 18,3 (1995): 79-100; Winfried 
Steffani and Uwe Thaysen (eds.), Demokratie in Europa: Zur Rolle der Parlamente, Opladen, 1995; Annette 
Elisabeth Töller, op. cit.; Philipp Norton (ed.), National Parliaments and the European Union, London: Rout-
ledge, 1996.
11Tapio Raunio, ‘Holding governments accountable in European affairs: Explaining cross-national varia-
tion,’ Journal of Legislative Studies 11,3-4 (2005): 319-342. Katrin Auel and Arthur Benz, ‘The politics of 
adaptation: The Europeanization of national parliamentary systems,’ Journal of Legislative Studies 11:3-4 
(2005): 372-393; Katrin Auel, ‘The Europeanization of the German Bundestag: Institutional Change and 
Informal Adaptation,’ German Politics 16,3 (2006, forthcoming). 
12Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,’ International Or-
ganization 42,3 (1988): 427-460; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: 
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which national governments are the key actors on the European level, preparing their positions 
in a national aggregation process and putting them forward in Brussels. This notion, in turn, is 
linked with the idea of legitimacy developing in a hierarchical structure, which is reflected by 
the term “chain of legitimacy.” This concept, however, may be considered outdated since at 
least the end of the 1990s. Even though the multi-level approach is at best a “descriptive meta-
phor,” it illustrates quite clearly that relations among actors are a lot more complex than the 
two-level model may suggest.13 Notwithstanding the fact that it does feature hierarchical ele-
ments (particularly European law), the structure of the EU institutional setting is heterarchical 
as a whole, which has implications for the question of legitimacy. In a heterarchical environ-
ment, legitimacy can and indeed must originate from various sources.14 This, however, puts the 
legitimizing role of hierarchical relations into perspective. 
 
Yet, considerations like these are no reason not to address the legitimizing role of national par-
liaments. Instead, they emphasize the need to empirically examine this role in the European 
multi-level system. However, since this role may be much more complex than conventional ap-
proaches would make us believe, it ought to be considered separate from the rigid conception of 
the chains of legitimacy.15  
 
The second subject area of this paper is the multifaceted scholarly discussion on “Europeani-
zation.” Beyond all the disputes on how to conceptualize the term, Radaelli’s understanding 
seems to help. He describes “Europeanization” as the impacts that European policies have on 
                                                                                                                                                             
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,’ in Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott (eds.), Economic and Politi-
cal Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context (London: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 29-80. 
13Edgar Grande, ‘Multi-Level Governance: Institutionelle Besonderheiten und Funktionsbedingungen des 
europäischen Mehrebenensystems,’ in Edgar Grande and Markus Jachtenfuchs (eds.), Wie problemlösungs-
fähig ist die EU? Regieren im europäischen Mehrebenensystem (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), p. 12; Like this 
quotation, all German quotations are translated by the author of this paper. Regarding the multi-level ap-
proach, see: Gary Marks, Lisbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-level Governance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1996): 341-378.  
14See Annette Elisabeth Töller, Komitologie (Opladen: 2002), pp. 151, 195. More recently, the debate has 
therefore focused on aspects other than (only) the creation of legitimation chains by representative parlia-
mentary assemblies. See, e.g., Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit., pp. 195, 207; Hubert Heinelt, ‘Civic Per-
spectives on a Democratic Transformation of the EU,’ in Jürgen R. Grote and Bernard Gbikpi (eds.), Parti-
cipatory Governance. Political and Societal Implications (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2002), pp. 97-120; Clau-
dio Radaelli, ‘Democratising Expertise?’ in Jürgen R. Grote and Bernard Gbikpi, op. cit, pp. 197-212. 
15In parallel with the discussion on the European ‘democratic deficit,’ the debate on the dwindling impor-
tance of national parliaments predominated among practitioners. As for the Bundestag, the 1993 Maas-
trichturteil of the Federal Constitutional Court had a significant catalyst function. As a result, the effects of 
European integration on the functions and competence of national parliaments in general, and the Bun-
destag in particular, and possibilities of countering such losses, have been increasingly addressed since 
the mid-1990s (early on: Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, ‘Funktionsverluste des Bundestags durch europäische 
Integration?’ Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 10,2 [1979]: S. 261-278). Not least against this background 
have younger analysts mainly pursued a comparative approach and investigated the reason for the con-
siderable variance in the extent and form of Europeanization of different European parliaments. Looking 
primarily at the extent of euro-political activities, Germany holds but a mid-field rank in Europe; compar-
ing the type of control that is exercised, the German Bundestag is reputed to be rather consensus-
oriented. See Katrin Auel, ‘Europäisierung der Arbeit nationaler Parlamente,’ in Edgar Grande and Rai-
ner Prätorius (eds.), Politische Steuerung und neue Staatlichkeit, (Baden-Baden: 2003), pp. 259-280; See Tapio 
Raunio, ‘Always One Step Behind?’; Matthias Zier, Nationale Parlamente in der EU (Göttingen: 2005). 
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national governmental systems, including polity, politics and policies.16 Starting from this un-
derstanding, I would like to elaborate further on these impacts on the national institutional set-
ting. These may be impacts that the institutions in the national political system “sustain,” as it 
were, which would make them “objects” of Europeanization. These impacts, however, cause a 
reaction among the institutions that – for instance by changing procedures and strategies – then 
become “subjects” of Europeanization. With this definition in mind, this paper is to be seen as a 
contribution to the discussion on “Europeanization” – not in the sense that it will (or even 
could) establish the all-round clarity that the debate has lacked so far. It deliberately avoids iso-
lating one specific dimension of Europeanization. Instead, the paper will take the Bundestag as 
an example to carry out an analysis of the different dimensions of Europeanization, identify in-
terrelations among them and highlight lines of development. In doing so, the following three 
dimensions of Europeanization will be addressed:  
 
- Legislative Europeanization describes the restriction of legislative options resulting 
from European policies, with a particular impact on the Bundestag as the key 
legislative actor.  
- Institutional Europeanization covers the development of institutional and proce-
dural provisions to organize and permit influence on the national government’s 
European policies. 
- Strategic Europeanization consists in national MPs taking the European Union as a 
decision-making center into account – but also as an addressee for their action – 
and in adjusting action patterns and routines accordingly.  
 
Whereas in the case of legislative Europeanization, the Bundestag is the object of Europeaniza-
tion, institutional and strategic Europeanization make the Bundestag and/or its elements the 
subjects of Europeanization. 
 
Another dimension of Europeanization consists in the European Union itself increasingly recog-
nizing national parliaments as actors, be it by trying to facilitate their participation in European 
decision making by European rules or by assigning to them roles in the European governmental 
system (we could call this “Europeanization of Europeanization”). This dimension, in which the 
Bundestag is both the subject and object of Europeanization, is outside the purview of this 
paper. 
 
Legislative Europeanization 
 
Under the concept of legislative Europeanization, this section will address the ever narrowing 
restrictions of legislative action in Germany which, as a matter of course, affect the Bundestag as 
the key legislative institution.  
 
In parliamentary democracies, the legislative function is regarded as one of the chief tasks of 
parliament (along with the functions of forming a government and holding it accountable, as 
well as exercising representative and communicative tasks). Over the past few decades there 
have been three trends that predominantly subjected this function to a good deal of change: the 
massive growth of state activities and – consequently – of legislative tasks; the informalization of 
politics, for instance through negotiations and agreements among governments and societal 
                                                 
16Claudio Radaelli, ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change,’ EIOP 4,8  
(2002): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm; on the general debate on Europeanization, see Kevin 
Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (New York: Oxford, 2003). 
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corporative actors; as well as Europeanization and internationalization, which have had the aggre-
gate effect of weakening the position of parliaments vis-à-vis governments.17
 
To determine the effects of European integration on national parliaments, the question to be 
raised is what makes the European Union different from other forms of regional or international 
organizations. The European Economic Community did indeed start with the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 as an international treaty among sovereign states. During the 1960s, however, mainly 
through the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, it turned into a community of law with 
a series of legal doctrines which today fundamentally distinguish the European legal order from 
the logics of international law (the law applicable between sovereign states): by virtue of its ju-
risdiction, the European Court of Justice developed doctrines on the Autonomy, the Direct Effect 
and the Primacy of Community Law as necessary principles for the European legal order to 
achieve the intended effects.18 These qualities of European law imply far-reaching obligations 
for member states and, consequently, for their parliaments as legislative bodies.19  
 
For the Bundestag (as for all the other national parliaments) this entails an obligation to trans-
late directives into national law which, as a two-stage instrument, set political goals but leave 
the choice of means to the respective member states. This confronts the Bundestag with the 
paradoxical situation of being unable to exert (any more) influence on the directive but of “still 
being politically responsible for its content to the people.”20 In areas where the Bundestag may 
normally take legislative action, the European Treaty and secondary European law impose sub-
stantial restrictions on national policy choices. Particularly the provisions on the Single Euro-
pean Market leave national legislators precious little room to decide by what measures they 
want to achieve particular political goals. The Bundestag can no longer act at all in those areas 
already addressed by European regulations; where there is a Community competence but not 
yet a regulation, Member States often have to notify the Commission of their policy plans and to 
adjust the content of measures under certain conditions. Sometimes they may not pass a plan-
ned measure at all.21 Finally, intergovernmental procedures so far established in the second and 
third pillar have increasingly tightened national lawmakers’ scope for action.  
 
To date, these actual restrictions of national legislative action have neither been qualified nor 
quantified in a reliable way,22 and this paper cannot entirely fulfill this major desideratum 
either. 
                                                 
17See Klaus von Beyme, ‘The Bundestag – Still the Centre of Decision-Making?’ in Ludger Helms (ed.), In-
stitutions and Institutional Change in the Federal republic of Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 32-
47. 
18Joseph Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe,” The Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 2403-2483; Anne-Marie 
Burley and Walter Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,’ International 
Organization 47,1 (1993): 41-75. 
19This obligation is not seen as legally binding for parliaments, instead the obligation devolves on the 
member states in toto. 
20Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Europa Aktuell 2., Berlin, 2002, pp. 4, 9. 
21Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Links Between National and Supra-National Institutions: A Legal View of a 
New Communicative Universe,’ in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), Linking EU and National Governance (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 24-52. 
22In his article of 1996, Schmitter quantifies the “issue arenas and levels of authority in Europe,” Philippe 
C. Schmitter, ‘Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts,’ in Gary Marks, 
Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfang Streeck (eds.), Governance in the European Union 
(London: Sage, 1996), p. 125. It is, however, not quite clear how these figures were obtained and what ex-
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Table 1: The Percentage of Bundestag Legislation 
Influenced by a “European Impulse” from 1983 to 2005 
 
Subject Area 10th ET 
(1983-87) 
11th ET 
(1987-90) 
12th ET 
(1990-94) 
13th ET 
(1994-98) 
14th ET 
(1998-2002) 
15 th ET 
(2002-2005) 
Home Affairs 4.4 2.3 14.5 11.9 19.2 12.9 
Justice 9.8 35 20 21.6 34.1 42.2 
Finance 22.9 25.6 22.7 25.0 38.0 36.2 
Economics 16.7 15 9.5 34.8 42.4 40.0 
Food & 
Agriculture 
58.8 28.6 52.0 65 79.2 75.0 
Labor & Social 
Policy  
6.0 5.9 11.0 15.8 23.3 15.6 
Family & Health  26.1 26.1 37.8 19.4 23.8 37.5 
Transport 40 37.5 26.1 36.4 28.6 40.0 
Post a. Telecomm.  33.3 0 50.0 71.4 - - 
Regional 
Planning 
0 10 9.1 9.1 - 50.0 
Education & 
Research 
0 0 25 12.5 0 0 
Environmental 
Policy 
20 66.7 75 54.6 69.2 81.3 
Average 16.8 19.9 24.1 25.9 34.5 34.6 
 
Source: Johanna Elo-Schäfer/Sven Grimm/Annette Elisabeth Töller, European Impulses in the Bundestag’s 
legislation from 1983 to 2005, Evaluation based on GESTA (German Bundestag, Federal Legislation Update), 
set of data, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces, Hamburg, 2006. The 
evaluation covers only those areas with a genuinely ”domestic“ task, as opposed to the fields of defense, 
foreign relations and development. A “-“ represents departments that no longer existed in the respective 
electoral term. Over the five electoral terms certain changes in the portfolios took place. Data were evalu-
ated accordingly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
actly they express. Also, in some points the values appear to be implausible. In the field of environmental 
policy, for instance, a mean value of 3 (“policy decisions at both national and EC level”) for 2001 seems 
rather low, national leeway is in fact increasingly disappearing. The same criticism applies to the data 
presented by Manfred G. Schmidt, ‘Die Europäisierung der öffentlichen Aufgaben,’ in Thomas Ellwein 
and Everhard Holtmann (eds.), 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Rahmenbedingungen - Entwicklungen - 
Perspektiven (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), p. 390-391. Andrew Moravcsik suggested that a bet-
ter method for measuring the Europeanization of policymaking is to look at who decides over the fund-
ing. This would, however, lead to an underestimation of EU-impact, since in EU policy there is a strong 
bias in favor of regulatory (instead of [re-]distributive) policies. Whereas with the data presented I only 
want to give an idea of the Europeanization of German legislation, a reliable method for measuring the 
Europeanization of public policies has yet to be found. 
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Before measuring functional restrictions23 on the Bundestag’s legislative options caused by Euro-
pean policies, we have to distinguish two categories of restrictions: the options will be restricted 
in total wherever European legal regulations no longer allow the Bundestag to exercise legis-
lative functions. Partial restrictions will apply wherever Bundestag legislation is possible, but 
bound by more or less stringent substantial specifications. While it is difficult to provide exact 
figures for the former category, the latter, in which legislative activities are possible (or even 
necessary) but subject to European requirements, can be quantified quite reasonably. An evalu-
ation of the “Federal Legislation Database” (GESTA) with regard to those measures that featured 
a “European impulse,”24 produced the following picture: (broken down by policy fields for the 
time from 1983 to 2005, i.e., from electoral terms ten to fifteen). 
 
A first glance at how the share of European impulses on overall legislation developed reveals 
that until the early 2000s it had grown steadily from 16.8 percent in the tenth electoral term (ET) 
to almost 20 percent in the eleventh, 24.1 percent in the twelfth, 25.9 percent in the thirteenth, 
and reached 34.5 percent in the fourteenth electoral term. Whereas these days, well over one-
third of all acts passed in Germany are influenced by a European impulse, this share did not 
grow in the last election period from 2002 to 2005 but remained constant.  
 
A closer look at the individual policy areas during the past electoral term shows that at present 
legal acts in environmental policy (81.3 percent), and agriculture (75.0 percent) have the highest 
percentage share of European impulses. Regarding the development in the individual spheres 
of policy throughout twenty-two years, none of them displayed a steady increase. Between elec-
toral terms ten and fourteen, the figures in most spheres of policy rose overall but were also 
subject to fluctuation. Between 1987 and 2002 the areas that particularly experienced a notice-
able increase were Home Affairs, Economics and Labour, Social Affairs and Agriculture. In 
other areas the relative share of European Impulses fluctuated around an intermediary value 
(Health and Transport). In the fields of Justice, Family and Health (especially due to health re-
lated issues), Regional Planning (including construction), Transport and Environmental policy 
the share of acts with a European impulse increased (further) from the fourteenth to the fifteen-
th electoral period, whereas in all other areas that had risen previously (e.g., Home Affairs, Fi-
nance, Economics, Agriculture ), a slight decrease in measurable Europeanization – even though 
on a high level – can be identified. The data presented broadly correspond with the develop-
ment of Community competences and policies during the time under review. 
 
Let us take a closer look at what exactly is covered by the notion of “European impulses” by 
evaluating the 112 European impulses identified in the fifteenth electoral term, from 2002 to 
2005 (see table 2): exactly one-half concerned directives that were to be translated into German 
legislation (either one single directive, two or more at a time or a directive plus a regulation or, 
e.g., an action plan); 20.5 percent were regulations that German law had to be adjusted to (a 
single regulation, several ones or a combination of a regulation and, e.g., a white book). 8.9 
percent of the European impulses were Council decisions including framework-decisions that 
                                                 
23A restriction of competence depicts the competences transferred to the Community by virtue of the Com-
munity Treaties. It fails to state, however, the extent to which the Community does actually use these 
competences and the degree of resulting restrictions of the Bundestag’s scope of action, cf. Suzanne S. 
Schüttemeyer, op. cit. Therefore, my focus is on the actually gaugeable restriction of legislative function, 
as opposed to the concept of restriction of competence, cf. Annette Elisabeth Töller, Europapolitik im Bun-
destag, op. cit., p. 45.  
24“European Impulse” is not an established term in German political science language. It was invented by 
those organizing the database. See below on what exactly is covered by the label “European Impulse.” 
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were introduced in 1997 by the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 34 2b) as the instrument of Police and 
Judicial Co-operation.25 Some 6.3 percent referred to decisions by the European Court of Justice; 
2.7 percent of the European impulses referred to stipulations of the Treaty itself. Another 11.6 
percent of the cases concerned “other impulses.” These range from rather precise stipulations 
such as requirements for regional aid, guidelines for state aid or employment policies to rather 
vague notions such as “demands” by the Community for certain standards or “requests” by the 
Commission to meet certain demands arising from the Treaty. 
  
Table 2: European Impulses to German Legislation 
in the 15th Electoral Period 
 
 
 
 
50%
20%
9%
6%
3%
12% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, when looking at the data shown in table 1, the following caveats must be made: 
 
1. As mentioned before, these statistics refer to partial restrictions of Bundestag 
legislation but fail to include fields of total restriction where, owing to the 
constraints of European law, the Bundestag can take no more legislative action. 
2. The data reflect neither the significance of the specific laws nor the quality and 
intensity of the respective European impulse. What is more, these figures fail to 
indicate the qualitative change that the European impulses produce in comparison 
with previous legislation, e.g., with regard to the style of regulation.26  
                                                 
25Whereas these decisions are taken by the Member State Representatives in the Council without 
decision-rights by the European Parliament, in its effect these framework-decisions resemble directives, 
inasmuch as they are binding regarding their objectives but Member States can choose the means when 
translating them into national law. 
26In the field of environmental policy, for instance, the effects of European on German environmental pol-
icy has triggered a considerable change from clear “command and control,” i.e.,. regulatory law with pro-
hibitions, orders and sanctions, to include procedural instruments (e.g., as a consequence of the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Directive or the Eco-Audit Regulation), see Hubert Heinelt, Tanja Malek, 
Randall Smith and Annette E. Töller (eds.), European Union Environment Policy and New Forms of Govern-
ance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). It has become apparent that such “unfamiliar“ regulatory styles can be 
integrated only at considerable frictional losses.  
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3. The predominance of particular legal instruments in specific sectors (e.g., regu-
lations in agriculture, directives in environmental policy) may influence the results 
in the individual spheres of policy. In contrast to regulations which frequently 
exclude national legislation, directives do indeed call for it – which may affect the 
figures concerning the “European impulses” to a degree where the exact extent of 
influence of European policy is not necessarily reflected. 
4. The survey makes only little (if any) reference to those fields where European 
impulses have a “hidden effect.” A new bill, for instance, may be worded 
specifically to allow the implementation of a foreseeable directive, or national 
regulations may be prepared to be a forerunner with regard to expected European 
regulatory processes (“regulatory competition”).27
 
The qualifications just made show that the presented percentages of German legislation as in-
fluenced by European policies reveal only the “tip of the iceberg.” Thus it can be stated that 
they give proof of a clear Europeanization and – in its wake – restriction of the legislative func-
tion of the German Bundestag.  
 
However, restrictions on its legislative functions have not hit the Bundestag like the proverbial 
bolt out of the blue. Instead, under the principle of limited attribution of competences, the Com-
munity requires explicit norms of competence in the Treaties to take any action. Those interna-
tional treaties that founded and subsequently changed the Treaties, and which bestowed upon 
the Community substantial and fresh competences with each step it took since the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1987, could not take effect until ratified in accordance with the provision of each 
member state. Under German constitutional provisions28 the Bundestag (among other bodies) 
has to give its consent, i.e., a majority of its members agreed to each transfer of competence to 
the European Community/Union. This does not mean, however, that the Bundestag when rati-
fying the Treaties was always fully aware of the implications they had and fully accepted each 
element of its own deprivation. Rather, there is a considerable momentum in the integration pro-
cess, as indicated by both the aforementioned emergence of legal dogmas through the jurisdic-
tion of the European Court of Justice and the development following the signing of the Single 
European Act. Amidst the rationality of harmonization in the Single Market and sectoral “spill-
overs,” the competences actually delegated to the Community were interpreted extensively, 
particularly by the European Commission. To a fair extent this development also was driven by 
national governments, which tend to pursue political options that would hardly find a national 
majority at the European level instead, and not always bothering much about limitations stipu-
lated by the treaties.29
 
What is more, the right of ratification of national parliaments does not automatically offer the 
possibility of exerting influence on the contents of the treaty. At the ratification stage MPs can 
only say either yea or nay. Apart from the fact that a treaty once negotiated by an intergovern-
mental conference is usually based on a complex package deal which will not produce a clear 
                                                 
27Sabine Pag, ‘Alltagsgeschäft EG: Die Umsetzung von EG-Vorschriften in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land,’ Integration 11,3 (1988): 130; Adrienne Héritier, Christoph Knill and Susanne Mingers, Ringing the 
Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the State: Britain, France, Germany 
(Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996). 
28Until 1992 it was Article 24 of the German Basic Law which demanded a simple majority. From the con-
stitutional amendment in late December 1992 the new Article 23 of the German Basic Law has required a 
two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (see below).  
29Ingolf Pernice, op. cit., p. 15. 
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winner or loser, any rejection by a national parliament during the ratification phase will create 
serious problems for the entire Community, as could be observed recently. This puts parlia-
ments under a lot of pressure to agree to the amendment.30 Real influence on the content of the 
amendment would have to be exerted at an earlier stage. So far, at least, the wording of treaties 
has been negotiated by national executives (with a certain degree of influence by the Commis-
sion and, recently, the Convention) at intergovernmental conferences. Cases of national parlia-
ments seriously exerting influence on treaty development – and having some extent of success 
at that – have become apparent in recent years only, particularly so in the European Conven-
tion.31
 
Institutional Europeanization 
 
As we have seen, the Bundestag has lost a fair amount of its autonomous legislative function 
and power. It could compensate for this loss primarily via the indirect way: by influencing the 
Federal Government’s European politics. Establishing a claim to information vis-à-vis the Fed-
eral Government, setting up special institutions, building capacities to process the abundance of 
EU-related information, and creating approaches to handle procedures technically at the Euro-
pean level are considered essential prerequisites for the Bundestag to exert influence on the Fed-
eral Government’s position on European politics.32
 
It was as early as 1957 that the Ratification Act of the Rome Treaty gave the Bundestag a claim 
to information vis-à-vis the Federal Government in matters of European politics. Article 2 of the 
Act reads: 
 
The Federal Government will ensure a continuous flow of information to the Bun-
destag and Bundesrat … on developments in the Council. If a Council decision 
necessitates German legislation or … establishes directly enforceable law, informa-
tion to that effect shall be supplied prior to the Council’s decision-making.33
 
The responsibility of forming a political opinion within the Bundestag – if the attempt was 
made – initially devolved upon the technical committees which dealt with EC documents in the 
Bundestag; in this context the dual mandate of MEPs until 1979 provided an opportunity for in-
tegration. In the early 1970s, the number of documents from the EC sharply increased,34 which 
triggered criticism among the members of technical committees who claimed that dealing with 
                                                 
30Tapio Raunio, op. cit., p. 190; Sven Hölscheidt, op. cit., p. 38; Katrin Auel, op. cit.. 
31See Andreas Maurer, op. cit. 
32Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit.; Katrin Auel, op. cit. In principle there are six different domains where 
the Bundestag could exert Euro-political influence: 1. decisions at constitutional level (treaty amendments 
and accessions); 2. decisions on the overall political direction other than of a constitutional or legislative 
nature; 3. the adoption of secondary law; 4. the translation of this European legal instrument into national 
law; 5. the application and operationalization of European legal instruments at European level (e.g. by the 
Commission and Comitology), as well as 6. European personnel policy, cf. in detail: Tapio Raunio, op. 
cit., p. 189; on personnel policy see Herwig C. H. Hofmann, ‘Parliamentary Representation in Europe’s 
System of Multi-Layer Constitutions: A Case Study of Germany,’ Maastricht Journal of European and Com-
parative Law 10,1 (2003): 1-23. In the context of this paper, only amendments to treaties, decisions on the 
overall political direction and legislative decisions are addressed.  
33Bundesgesetzblatt, 1957, Part II, p. 753. 
34While in electoral term six (1969-1972) the Bundestag was concerned with 745 EC bills, their number 
more than doubled to 1,759 in electoral term seven (1973-1976); Peter Schindler, Chronik Deutscher Bun-
destag: Gesetze - Statistik - Dokumentation. 10. Wahlperiode 1983-1987 (Bonn: 1987), p. 998. 
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such documents in parliament was increasingly utilizing resources without showing any actual 
result. MPs also thought that the need for them to identify the important bills among the mass 
of proposals and documents submitted was making undue demands on them. Frequently the 
plenary did not take a decision until the legislative act had long been adopted by the Council of 
Ministers.35 A change in the rules of procedure in 1977 was intended to facilitate the selection of 
proposals and documents by their significance and to streamline the procedure. It did, on the 
whole, improve the flow of information, but failed to enable the Parliament to exert influence on 
the Federal Government’s European policy.36 Even subcommittees for EC-related concerns set 
up in some technical committees did not solve the problem. 
 
In the course of the 1980s (after all dual mandates had expired), repeated attempts were made 
to employ a specialized body to tackle those coordination problems in dealing with EC docu-
ments that had become painfully obvious.37 The establishment of a Bundestag “Commission on 
European Affairs” in 1983 was but a stopgap solution: formally established as a commission of 
inquiry under its rules of procedure, the Commission could submit the result of its work to the 
plenary only as a report and not as a recommendation for decision, which denied it direct access 
to parliamentary procedures.38 At the beginning of the eleventh electoral term (1987), there was 
consensus that a new model was needed, but the opposition of foreign policy specialists at the 
parliamentary and governmental levels prevented the establishment of an independent and 
specialized committee. Eventually the only agreement reached was to add to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee a subcommittee for EC-related concerns. Tension, however, arose in conjunction 
with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s scope of competence and the (truly “domestic”) tasks of 
the subcommittee, and from the fact that a subcommittee cannot really function independently 
and enjoys no political status of its own. Finally the work of the Committee was discontinued 
for “reputation-, procedural and competence-related” reasons.39  
 
The preparations for the Intergovernmental Conferences on the European Union and the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union got under way late in 1990. At this same time the newly elected 
twelfth German Bundestag was facing enormous pressure to act since MPs were not inclined to 
let the crucial decisions due to be taken on further integration pass them by. It seemed that now 
the so far controversial issue of what institutional shape a specialized board ought to have was 
less significant than the fact that it was established in the first place. 
 
The specialized independent committee, established on September 4, 1991, was to deal with the 
amendment of the EC Treaties, institutional matters, cooperation with the EP and other national 
parliaments, and the deliberation of EC documents.40 One particular aim was to “keep constant 
                                                 
35Horst Ferdinand, ‘EG-Vorlagen im Plenum,’ in Hans-Achim Roll (ed.), Plenarsitzungen des Deutschen 
Bundestages (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1982), pp. 146ff. 
36Klaus Hänsch, ‘Europäische Integration und parlamentarische Demokratie,’ Europa-Archiv 41,7 (1986): 
197. 
37Michael Fuchs, ‘Der Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union des Deutschen Bun-
destages,’ in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 35: 1 (2004):  3-24 . 
38Peter Mehl, Die Europa-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestags (Kehl: Engel, 1987), p. 46. 
39Uli Brückner, ‘Der deutsche Bundestag im europäischen Maßstab: Neue Anforderungen durch die 
Europäische Integration,’ in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Weßels (eds.), Parlament und 
Gesellschaft. Eine Funktionsanalyse der repräsentativen Demokratie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), p. 
227; Alwin Brück, ‘Europäische Integration und Entmachtung des Deutschen Bundestages: Ein Unteraus-
schuss ist nicht genug,’ Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 19,2 (1988): 223. 
40Bundestag official publications 12/739; Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit., p. 74. 
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track of intergovernmental conferences rather than merely ratify the treaty in the end.”41 The 
committee was a novelty inasmuch as it was the first genuine interdisciplinary committee (apart 
from the traditional committees on Rules, Petitions and Budget). Soon, however, it became ap-
parent that this institutional response to the problem could not meet the claim to an effective 
European policy either. The fact that the EC Committee would only be officially in charge of 
European issues “where no other technical committee was” turned out to be a particular hitch. 
The Committee was actually not once in charge of dealing with EC-documents that were of 
decision-making relevance.42 In a relevant number of cases it deliberated on documents only af-
ter they had been approved in Brussels.43 Finally, to work out the Ratification Act for the 
Maastricht Treaty (the most prominent event in European politics during the twelfth electoral 
term), a special committee was set up because the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Economic 
Affairs Committee, the Finance Committee and the Legal Committee could not agree which of 
them should be in charge – they agreed, however, that the EC committee was not to be in 
charge.44
 
The establishment of the Committee on European Union (EU Committee) in the thirteenth German 
Bundestag on December 14, 1994, must be seen against the background of the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty: for one, legal experts voiced serious doubts as to whether the provisions of 
the former Article 24 of the German Basic Law, which had so far been the basis for transferring 
competences to the EC “could still legitimize what [...] was about to emerge in the sense of a 
European Union within the near future.”45 For another, the Länder  (federal states) in particular 
were intent on linking a further restriction of their legislative rights to the explicit approval of 
the Bundesrat and to its participation whenever such competences are exercised at the Euro-
pean level. In connection with this process, the Bundestag took its time considering its Euro-
political interests and only cautiously went along with the activities of the Bundesrat.46 As a re-
sult, the new Article 23 became part of the German Constitution, which now provides that any 
transfer of sovereign rights to the EU/EC requires the support of two-thirds majority votes both 
                                                 
41Süssmuth, as quoted by Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit., p. 76. 
42Bundestag official publication 12/739; Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit., p. 91. Being formally in charge 
(the German “Federführung”), however, is the central procedural resource allowing committees to for-
mulate for the plenum an independent recommendation for decision on a certain issue and to assert their 
position vis-à-vis other committees. 
43Ibid., p. 101. 
44Ibid., p. 137. 
45Udo Di Fabio, ‘Der neue Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes. Positivierung vollzogenen Verfassungswandels 
oder Verfassungsneuschöpfung?’ Der Staat 32,2 (1993): 193.  
46See Claus Dieter Classen, ‘Maastricht und die Verfassung: kritische Bemerkungen zum neuen "Europa-
Artikel,’ Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 26,2 (1993); 57; Franz Möller and Martin Limpert, ‘Informations- und 
Mitwirkungsrechte des Bundestages in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union,’ Zeitschrift für Parla-
mentsfragen 24,1 (1993): 22. In the debate it has been frequently ascertained that the Bundesrat has been 
much quicker and more systematic than the Bundestag at assessing the impact of European integration as 
well as taking and politically enforcing the necessary compensatory measures. Only ostensibly, however, 
are the Bundesrat and the Bundestag two institutions similarly affected by integration. In actual fact, be-
hind the Bundesrat measures we find the far-reaching problem of the power shift between the central 
state and the Länder resulting from integration (cf. Tanja A. Börzel, op. cit., p. 238). As far as resources are 
concerned, the Bundesrat enjoys the backing of sixteen Länder executives (which, in turn, exert pressure 
on their Länder parliaments). Thus, the situations of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag will not stand di-
rect comparison. 
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of Bundestag and Bundesrat (as opposed to only a simple majority of the Bundestag that was 
required before). 
 
The “participation” of the Bundestag in European decision making requires the Federal Gov-
ernment to inform it “comprehensively and at the earliest point in time possible” and enable the 
parliament to submit its opinion before a decision is adopted at European level. The Federal 
Government must take this comment “into account” during negotiations.47 What is more, Ar-
ticle 45 of the German Basic Law stipulates the establishment of a Committee on European 
Union which – apart from the fact that it is enshrined in the constitution – is particular because 
the Bundestag can empower the committee to “exercise the Bundestag’s rights in relation to the 
Federal Government in accordance with Article 23.” The rules of procedure have been adjusted 
accordingly and now give all committees ample rights to take up EU issues on their own initia-
tive. The Federal Government on its part made an interdepartmental arrangement to provide 
for the necessary procedures.48 The government is now obliged to inform the Bundestag ex-
tensively, for instance, about the progress of legislative decision making on European level. The 
size of the committee secretariat (“European Office”) was augmented considerably. 
 
The practical work of the EU Committee has been focused on questions regarding the revision 
of the Treaty or other major reform projects. For instance, the Committee was in charge of deal-
ing with the Agenda 2000, the Act Ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU enlargement, the 
Charter of Basic Rights and the Constitutional Treaty.49 The Committee (co-)deliberates pro-
posals for legislative acts only if they are of particular concern to European integration policy. 
Also, it usually does not deal with the translation of European directives into national law, 
which is considered to be the task of the technical committees.50 However, members of the EU 
Committee tend to be dissatisfied with the resources that their colleagues in technical com-
mittees – except for the committees for agriculture and for environmental policy – invest in 
European policies.51  
 
Strikingly enough, the EU Committee has only rarely used its formal rights, e.g. to commit the 
Government with an opinion pursuant to Article 23, paragraph 3, second sentence of the Con-
stitution.52 There are various reasons for this: first, the procedures linked to the special rights 
are still too complicated. In response to the limited suitability of formal procedures, the Com-
mittee worked out a “semi-formal approach”: after deliberations among Committee members 
had been completed and a broad political consensus reached on a specific topic, the Govern-
                                                 
47As for the regulations on the rights of the Bundestag and the differences in wording between Article 23 
and the implementing law, compare Article 23 of the German Basic Law and the Act on the Co-operation 
Between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters of the European Union, cf. Franz 
Möller and Martin Limpert, op. cit., p. 27; Sven Hölscheidt and Thomas Schotten, op. cit., p. 131, Matthias 
Zier, op. cit., pp. 196-197.  
48See Sven Hölscheidt, op. cit., p. 32. 
49Christian Sterzing and Stefan Tidow, ‘Die Kontrolle der deutschen Europapolitik durch den EU-
Ausschuss des Bundestags – Bilanz und Reformpotenziale,’ Integration 24,3 (2001): 278; Friedbert Pflüger, 
‘Der Europaausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages in der 14. Legislaturperiode,’ Integration 25,4 (2002): 
325-330; Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 235, p. 328. 
50See Christian Sterzing and Stefan Tidow, op. cit., p. 279, Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 199. 
51Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 282. 
52Sven Hölscheidt, op. cit.; Christian Sterzing and Stefan Tidow, op. cit., p. 281; Wolfgang Ismayr, Der 
Deutsche Bundestag im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2nd rev. ed. (Opladen: Leske & 
Budrich, 2001), p. 296; Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 201, gives examples. 
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ment was notified in writing of the Committee’s position and requested to take it into account 
accordingly. This clearly effective approach, however, was torpedoed by the intervention of the 
Rules Committee, which classified this practice as an unacceptable bypassing of formal proce-
dures.53  
 
Second, the Committee will have to make a point of maintaining good relations with the tech-
nical committees and avoiding competition with them. Obviously, insisting on procedural privi-
leges would hardly help things.54  
 
Third, the majority situation in the EU Committee reflects that prevailing in the entire Bun-
destag, i.e., the Federal Government can rely on its political majority there as well. Thus, due to 
the logic of parliamentary systems, the majority of members on the Committee – on the whole – 
are not interested in unduly restricting the government by a formal mandate.55 In some in-
stances, formal resolutions were even adopted in order to support the government’s position; 
by the same token there are rare cases in which opinions were expressed to oppose it.56 All in 
all, the Committee tends to avoid confrontation with the government.57
 
Yet European politics do not follow strongly the usual distinctions according to party lines. 
There tends to be a stronger antithesis of Parliament and government than in other, nationally 
defined technical fields.58 One reason is that at least in case of treaty revisions finally a super-
majority of two thirds in the plenary is needed.59 Another reason is that whereas European in-
tegration has never been a controversial issue in the Bundestag, in times of decreasing public 
support for Europe, the Committee sees itself rather as a defender than a critic of the EU.60 Thus 
the working style in the Committee tends to be rather consensus-oriented.  
 
In contrast to the field of preparation of treaties and other major decisions where the EU Com-
mittee at least to a certain extent established itself as a central parliamentary actor and brought 
the Bundestag’s influence to bear, the situation with respect to European legislation is some-
what different. The EU Committee virtually makes no use of the formal procedures of influ-
encing the Federal Government’s activities in this field. Recommendations for decisions to the 
plenary in matters of EU legislation are few (in the thirteenth Bundestag, for instance, they 
reached 8 percent of all EU-related issues), and in a mere 1.5 percent of all cases did the plenary 
discuss the topic.  
 
                                                 
53Cf. Christian Sterzing and Stefan Tidow, op. cit., p. 278-80; Roland Sturm and Heinrich Pehle, Das neue 
deutsche Regierungssystem (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2005,  2nd ed.),  p. 78. 
54Cf. Christian Sterzing and Stefan Tidow, op. cit., p. 279; cf. Tapio Raunio, op. cit, p. 193; Matthias Zier, 
op. cit., p. 232. 
55Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit.; Katrin Auel, op. cit.; Tapio Raunio, op. cit., p. 191. This is what Thomas 
König does not acknowledge when he models this constellation as a principal-agent-problem, see 
Thomas König, op. cit. p. 29.  
56As in the case of the Convention’s working method, see Christian Sterzing and Stefan Tidow, op. cit., p. 
280; Katrin Auel, op. cit.. 
57Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 234, 289. 
58This is among other things displayed by the fact that the EU Committee tends to be an “opposition 
committee,” usually – but not always – chaired by a member of the major minority fraction in Parliament. 
59Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 338. 
60Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 364. 
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The overall involvement of plenary sessions with European issues has been low. Whereas Saal-
feldt observed that the number of discussions regarding European aspects of particular issues 
(in the frame of parliamentary questions in plenary) has risen recently,61 Zier attributes this to 
the Convention and the Constitutional Treaty and expects a renormalization on a rather low 
level afterwards.62
 
As in other areas, also in European policies we can observe informal procedures of “co-
steering”63 between majority parliamentary fractions and the government. A key arena where 
parliamentary influence is exerted on European politics is that of parliamentary working 
groups, which are the issue-specific sub-organizations at the fraction level. Also with regard to 
European politics, it is at this level that “the Federal Government is most likely to make con-
cessions.”64 Yet the significance of such control relations, i.e., whether such procedures repre-
sent the exception or the rule, remains to be assessed.65  
 
At the end of the day, European policy remains the domain of a small group of MPs. Saalfeld 
observes a clear discrepancy between the great importance that MPs attach to issues of Euro-
pean politics and the moderate resources they are prepared to invest in it. The explanation is 
found in a series of factors:66 the reluctance of most MPs to deal with European issues in depth 
can be explained by the perception that it is not worth investing scarce resources (especially 
time) for activities unlikely to boost your chances of being reelected. Although many questions 
covered by European legislation are of immediate concern to the constituencies, they are mostly 
of a complex nature and do not sell very well. Also, MPs are used to investing resources that 
yield somewhat predictable results. This does not apply in the field of European politics. In 
national parties alike, European politics and politicians have played but a minor role. After all, 
many German MPs view the creation of legitimacy for European politics as a prime task for the 
European Parliament.67  
 
Finally, we are confronted with another structural problem that results from the different char-
acteristics of the various parliamentary procedures: while, under original national legislation, 
the Bundestag has procedural sovereignty and thus ample formal resources,68 its possibilities of 
exerting influence on European legislation are limited to the mechanisms and resources of par-
liamentary control, irrespective of whether they are employed by way of formal control mecha-
                                                 
61On all figures mentioned in this paragraph see Thomas Saalfeld, ‘The Bundestag: Institutional Incre-
mentalism and Behavioural Reticence,’ in Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz (eds.), Germany, Europe and the 
Politics of Constraint (Oxford, 2003), pp. 86-88.  
62Matthias Zier, op. cit. 239-240, 329. 
63Manfred Schwarzmeier, Parlamentarische Mitsteuerung. Strukturen und Prozesse informalen Einflusses 
im Deutschen Bundestag (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag , 2001).  
64Interview, Katrin Auel, op. cit.. 
65Katrin Auel, ‘The Europeanization of the German Bundestag: Institutional Change and Informal Adap-
tation,’ German Politics 16:3, (2006, forthcoming); Matthias Zier, op. cit. 235, 289. 
66Cf. Thomas Saalfeld, op. cit., pp. 74, 89; Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit., p. 154; Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 
283. 
67Richard S. Katz, ‘Representation, the Locus of Democratic Legitimation and the Role of the National 
Parliaments in the European Union,’ in Richard S. Katz and Bernhard Weßels (eds.), The European Parlia-
ment, the National Parliaments and European Integration (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 28-29; Matthias Zier, op. cit., 308. 
68Particularly the option of revising and amending drafts, cf. Roland Sturm and Heinrich Pehle, op. cit., p. 
78. 
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nisms or informal “co-steering” processes. This reveals an imbalance between the means and 
the end, which does not really motivate MPs to become active in Europolitics. 
 
Strategic Europeanization 
 
As has been outlined above, the commitment of German MPs in matters of European politics 
has been quite limited. Nonetheless, recent research on this subject, especially by Auel, iden-
tified several changes in the development of strategies, constituting a shift not to be under-
estimated, particularly compared to the situation of only few years ago.69
 
The first change concerns the sources of information: In contrast to the mid-1990s, when reliable 
information links between MPs and actors at European level were the exception rather than the 
rule, members of the Bundestag nowadays have more often direct contacts with European 
authorities. Both the offices of MEPs and the members of the Commission act as the parlia-
mentarians’ “early warning systems” that notify them, sometimes even at a very early stage, 
about initiatives planned by the Commission.70 National MPs increasingly seize the 
opportunity provided by the European Parliament to take part in meetings of its committees, 
and visit the EP predominantly to establish informal personal contacts.71 Yet, unlike several 
other national parliaments, the Bundestag did not decide to have an “outpost,” i.e., a small 
office directly at the European Parliament in Brussels.72
 
What is more, national MPs from other member states can be important suppliers of informa-
tion. Particularly members of opposition parliamentary groups benefit from contacts to parlia-
ments in which the “sister party” is part of the governing majority – and thus has better access 
to information.73  
 
The second change occurred in terms of the MPs’ horizon: the need to make the government 
consider the position of parliament (or of the parliamentary majority) in the Council is no 
longer the only point of concern. Instead, MPs choose areas where they expect commitment to 
be rewarding, to determine – upon consultation with parliamentarians from other Member 
States – the positions of Council members so they can figure out options for coalitions and tex-
tual leeway.74 This approach virtually enables MPs to stand their ground against government 
representatives who represent the national position in the Council. Back in the mid-1990s any 
such look beyond one’s own national horizon would have been highly unlikely for national 
MPs. 
 
                                                 
69Esp. Katrin Auel, op. cit.; as compared to Annette Elisabeth Töller, op. cit.. 
70Katrin Auel op. cit.; cf. also Thomas Saalfeld, op. cit., p. 83..  
71Karlheinz Neunreither, ‘The European Parliament and National Parliaments – Conflict or Cooperation?’ 
Journal of Legislative Studies 11,3-4 (2005): 466-489. In view of the frequent use of these offers by national 
MPs, Neuenreither reports that occasionally differing views prevail among MEPs: In an interview, the 
term ‘overkill’ was used to characterize the amount of formal and informal EP/NP contacts. The NPs, the 
same critical voice added, would better spend their time at home and organize effective scrutiny of their 
respective governments.  
72Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 274. 
73E.g., Austrian People’s Party MPs are important contact points for members of the Christian Democratic 
parliamentary fraction in the Bundestag, Katrin Auel, op. cit. 
74Katrin Auel, op. cit.. 
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The third change consists of MPs taking “the direct way”: a small but growing number of 
Members of the Bundestag – affectionately referred to by Auel as “Euro Foxes” – have become 
active on European scale. These MPs utilize direct contacts with the Commission and MEPs to 
influence the development of secondary community law at European level at a very early stage 
– and quite successfully so, as they state.75 This applies particularly to opposition politicians 
who obviously have no access to the above avenues of informally influencing the Federal Gov-
ernment. 
 
The particular features of the more recent strategies by Members of the Bundestag become even 
more apparent when compared to MPs in other countries. While the Danish Folketing has a 
clear right of veto regarding the negotiating position of the Danish Government in Brussels, and 
the British House of Commons is primarily concerned with creating a public forum for such 
issues, German MPs have developed “by-pass strategies” instead.76 Focusing on the European 
political scene this way exonerates MPs from troublesome intra-parliamentary procedures and 
the requirement to make the government cooperate, and also tends to reduce the uncertainty 
about the effect of resources employed. Even though these approaches may not necessarily 
make Members of the Bundestag systematic and frequent actors in European politics, i.e., 
“multi-level players,” such strategic Europeanization will enrich the dimensions discussed so 
far by a new one that is bound to be the subject of further empirical analysis.77
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper addresses the Europeanization of the German Bundestag against the background of 
two theoretical discussions. The discussion on the democratic legitimacy of governance in the EU 
has so far addressed national parliaments predominantly under the expectation that they would 
contribute to the legitimacy of Council decisions by creating legitimation chains. Publications 
that deal with the theory of integration and that conceptualize the European Union as a com-
plex multi-level system, insinuate, however, that the idea of chains producing legitimacy corres-
ponds to the concept of a two-level game, which itself is an inadequate device for understand-
ing reality. Conversely, this discussion is criticized for taking the legitimizing role of national 
parliaments for granted without scrutinizing empirically whether the parliaments do indeed 
perform the function they were given, i.e., to monitor the European policies pursued by their 
governments. One of the points made in the context of the theoretical discussion on Europeani-
zation was that once the concept of Europeanization is narrowed down to the impacts that Euro-
pean integration has on national governmental systems, it may be useful to pick out a concrete 
example (in our case the Bundestag) to look at several dimensions of Europeanization, and to 
examine them in their interdependence on the one hand and their theoretical implications on 
the other.  
 
Notwithstanding the reservations that have to be made regarding the explanatory range of the 
data, the analysis of legislative Europeanization revealed that in the course of the past twenty 
years the Bundestag’s legislation has been clearly “Europeanized” and its scope of action has 
been reduced considerably. Even where the Bundestag is still allowed to pass national bills, af-
ter the ratification of the EEA in 1987 already one-fifth of its legislative decisions were subject to 
                                                 
75Ibid., p. 13; Matthias Zier, op. cit.  
76Katrin Auel, ibid., p. 18. 
77Ibid., op. cit. 
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explicit restrictions under supranational European law (or at least under the action of supra-
national institutions), a rate that has since risen to one-third.  
 
The transformation of the Bundestag from object to subject of Europeanization turned out to be a 
lengthy procedure. For many years (indeed up to 1994), formal institutional reactions in the 
shape of specialized committees were unable to prevail against the protection-of-vested-rights 
mentality borne by the members of technical committees, which could also be attributed to the 
general consensus on the fundamental direction of European integration in Germany. Only 
after the famous Maastricht judgment by the German Federal Constitutional Court and in the 
wake of action by the Bundesrat did the Bundestag set up a committee in 1994 that – in terms of 
its competence and procedural rights – seems generally suitable to exert relevant influence on 
European policies on behalf of the Bundestag.  
 
At the stage of the practical implementation of these formal institutional possibilities we have to 
distinguish between major developments (such as amendments of the Treaties) and questions of 
everyday legislation. In the field of Treaty revision (such cases are few and far between and 
therefore enjoy a certain degree of public attention) the Bundestag and its EU Committee have 
succeeded since the mid-1990s in influencing the Federal Government’s negotiations and in 
implementing, in isolated cases, ideas of their own. In terms of European legislation, however, 
the EU Committee is not involved on a regular basis and the commitment of parliamentarians 
in the technical committees is generally rather limited, a fact that becomes painfully obvious 
when considering, e.g., the stringent Europolicy of the Danish Folketing.  
 
This is not only due to the persistent sluggishness of formal procedures, but also linked to the 
fact that, in concrete processes of formulating policy, the unity between majority parliamentary 
groups and the Government (“government majority”) common in the German parliamentary 
system seems to be more pronounced than in major issues of further developing the Union. This 
means that any influence on formulating European policy is dependent on informal “co-
steering,” for instance in parliamentary working groups. Nonetheless, the degree of involve-
ment of German MPs in European policies on the whole remains low, particularly among those 
who are not on the EU Committee. There are various reasons for this. The problems arising 
from the need to process large quantities of unstructured information are far from solved; the 
task of making intraparliamentary procedures compatible with European decision making is a 
long-term challenge. For example, it is important not only to finalize deliberations on a docu-
ment before it is submitted for decision in Brussels – even today, twenty percent of the Euro-
pean drafts discussed in the EU-Committee has already been passed in Brussels when the Com-
mittee happens to deal with it.78 In view of the numerous stages of deliberations, especially 
with co-decision procedure and repeated modifications of the proposal, it must also be ensured 
that national parliamentary deliberations are always based on the latest update of the propo-
sal.79  
 
A reason that has deeper roots is the lack of appeal of European politics that makes it relatively 
unattractive for German MPs, all the more so if one suggests that their (legitimate) prime 
concern is focused on being reelected. Issues of formulating politics at the European level are 
not very effective publicity. What is more, the effects of possible activities are difficult to judge 
for the MPs themselves. Yet we still know too little about the significance of informal “co-
steering” in European politics. 
                                                 
78Mathias Zier, op. cit., p. 344. 
79See also Matthias Zier, op. cit., p. 364. 
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Even though the institutional setting for parliamentary control of the Government’s Euro-
politics has been considerably improved, at the end of the day the Bundestag cannot make Gov-
ernment follow its positions or mandates. However, apart from that, the idea of full coverage 
and strict control relations between the Bundestag (or its majority parliamentary groups) and 
the Federal Government in questions of formulating European policies under the concept of 
chains of legitimacy is highly ambivalent. A clear-cut mandate would not only further compli-
cate the Federal Government’s decision making on the European level – which is already fa-
mous for being poorly coordinated80 – but even more limit the leeway needed to settle a Euro-
pean compromise. This may weaken Germany’s negotiating position in Brussels and, as a fre-
quent recurrence, lead to isolation and consequently even cause the loss of all national influ-
ence.81 Another structural restriction results from the fact that even an imperative mandate will 
not guarantee that the parliamentary position will ultimately be taken into account when the 
Council decides according to the majority principle and a national veto can thus be overruled. 
Finally, the practical applicability of chains of legitimacy appears doubtful even from a more 
global point of view: a “perfect world” in which all national parliaments (twenty-five at this 
moment) would master the art of committing their respective governments to their position 
might seem desirable as far as chains of legitimacy are concerned; under aspects of decision-
making effectiveness (even with majority decisions), however, it would be fatal. And, as Fritz 
Scharpf so aptly phrased it, “where effectiveness is near zero, there is little hope for legiti-
macy.”82  
 
Empirical research has shown that rigid national chains of control cannot simply be created as 
the need arises. They are not consistent with the strong political unit of parliamentary majority 
and government in Germany. Also, they do not match the complex constellation in a multi-level 
system where different approaches, if pursued purposefully, appear to be more successful. The 
more recent approaches in the development of strategies including the bypassing strategies of 
Members of the Bundestag will not make the Bundestag a “serious actor in the European game 
of multi-level dominance.”83 However, it shows that we have to take a wider range of phenom-
ena into account than the narrow concept of chains of control and legitimacy suggest.84 Ten-
dencies like strategic Europeanization – even though we might not yet be able to measure their 
real importance – underpin the idea of the multi-level approach: many players are involved at 
many levels in one way or another. In terms of democratic theory, however, and with all due 
scepticism about the concept of chains of legitimacy, a development in this direction does not 
seem to be the most desirable solution either. Such forms of participation in formulating Euro-
pean policies may be effective but they are not accountable to an electorate or the public.  
 
Another dimension of Europeanization of the German Bundestag that could not be addressed in 
this paper concerns three trends:  
 
                                                 
80Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William Paterson, ‘Deutschlands europäische Diplomatie – die Ent-
wicklung des regionalen Milieus,’ in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutsche Europapolitik: Optionen wirksamer 
Interessenvertretung (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1998), pp. 11-103; Hans-Ulrich Derlien, ‘Germany. Fail-
ing Successfully?’ in Hussein Kassim, B. Guy Peters and Vincent Wright (eds.), The National Co-ordination 
of EU Policy. The Domestic Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 54-78. 
81Cf. Ingolf Pernice, op. cit., p. 7; Katrin Auel, op. cit. 
82Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Demokratische Politik in Europa,’ Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 6,4 (1995),: 567.  
83Cf. Roland Sturm and Heinrich Pehle, op. cit., p. 73. 
84This criticism also holds true for the really interesting recent study by Matthias Zier.  
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1. The increasing standardization of the role and rights of national parliaments in 
relation to their governments at European level (by the EC Treaty or its protocols);  
2. A direct role of national parliaments in Treaty revision as a result of the new 
method of the Convention; 
3. The development of more or less far-reaching ideas for institutionalizing the 
role of national parliaments in formulating European politics, be it in third 
chambers or as “guardians of subsidiarity.”85  
 
Considering issues of democratic theory, the first trend may be regarded as harmless and the 
second one seems quite welcome, while the third may appear to be highly ambiguous. Third 
chambers will overstretch the capacity of national parliaments and of the European govern-
mental system. On the surface, the role of guardians of subsidiarity would look quite attractive 
if it permitted national parliaments to be involved at a very early stage of formulating European 
policies and improved the level of information on the whole. Yet, even this role might stunt the 
capacities of most national parliaments, not to mention the question of practical applicability 
and the legal enforceability of this principle of subsidiarity. 
 
An overall view of the different dimensions of Europeanization of the Bundestag addressed 
here reveals a considerable delay between legislative Europeanization and the institutional and 
strategic responses which were realized in waves. Reasonably viable institutional solutions 
were not found until the mid-1990s, a time when approaches towards regulating the role of na-
tional parliaments at the European level were increasing, i.e., the Bundestag experienced pres-
sure to act on a European scale, too. Strategic Europeanization as we know it, however, took 
place towards the end of that decade only – and its extent is still difficult to measure. It may 
come as no surprise that it coincided roughly with the intergovernmental conference at Nice, 
which most probably marked the end of traditional mechanisms of revising the Treaties. How-
ever, a comprehensive redefinition of the Bundestag’s role in the European multi-level system is 
yet to come.86
 
Some current developments are mutually dependent: the Bundestag could only act as a guar-
dian of subsidiarity if it had access to sound communication networks at the European level. 
The Europeanization of information, for instance in the shape of a system documenting Euro-
pean legislative projects which is open to national parliaments and the general public alike 
(virtually an upgraded and updated version of the observatoire législatif) could constitute a major 
step forward on the road towards tackling the active Europeanization of the Bundestag and 
other national parliaments from an organizational point of view.87  
 
Finally, the scholarly and practical political discussions of Europeanization (including this pa-
per) tend to overrate the role of institutions. On the one hand we have seen that seemingly far-
reaching constitutional stipulations cannot guarantee that Parliamentary control is effectively 
taking place. On the other hand, if what we want is a further active Europeanization of the Bun-
destag (but this dogma could be subject to a more controversial debate, too), the Europeani-
zation of institutions is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. What would have to be con-
                                                 
85The European Convention, Working Group IV “The Role of National Parliaments,” Final report of 
Working Group IV on the role of national parliaments, CONV 353/02, WG IV 17, Brussels, 22 Oct 2002, 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00353en2.pdf; see Ingolf Pernice, op. cit., p. 13. 
86See also Mattias Zier, op. cit., p. 16.  
87See also Tapio Raunio, ‘Much Ado About Nothing? National Legislatures and The Constitutional 
Treaty,’ European Integration online Papers (EioP) 9:9 (2005): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-009a.htm.
 
21 
sidered in addition is the (further) Europeanization of routine procedures, strategies and the 
motivation structure among national MPs.  
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